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i
Whoever has looked into a modern treatise on logic of the common sort, will 
doubtless remember the two distinctions between clear and obscure conceptions, 
and between distinct and confused conceptions. They have lain in the books now 
for nigh two centuries, unimproved and unmodified, and are generally reckoned 
by logicians as among the gems of their doctrine.
A clear idea is defined as one which is so apprehended that it will be recognized 
wherever it is met with, and so that no other will be mistaken for it. If it fails of this 
clearness, it is said to be obscure.
This is rather a neat bit of philosophical terminology; yet, since it is clearness 
that they were defining, I wish the logicians had made their definition a little 
more plain. Never to fail to recognize an idea, and under no circumstances to 
mistake another for it, let it come in how recondite a form it may, would indeed 
imply suchprodigious force and clearness of intellect as is seldom met with in this 
world. On the other hand, merely to havesuch an acquaintance with the idea as 
to have become familiar with it, and to have lost all hesitancy in recognizing it in 
ordinary cases, hardly seems to deserve the name of clearness of apprehension, 
since after all it only amounts to a subjective feeling of mastery which may be 
entirely mistaken. I take it, however, that when the logicians speak of “clearness,” 
they mean nothing more than such a familiarity with an idea, since they regard the 
quality as but a small merit, which needs to be supplemented by another, which 
they call distinctness.
A distinct idea is defined as one which contains nothing which is not clear. This 
is technical language; by the contents of an idea logicians understand whatever 
is contained in its definition. So that an idea is distinctly apprehended, according 
to them, when we can give a precise definition of it, in abstract terms. Here the 
professional logicians leave the subject; and I would not have troubled the reader 
with what they have to say, if it were not such a striking example of how they 
have been slumbering through ages of intellectual activity, listlessly disregarding 
the enginery of modern thought, and never dreaming of applying its lessons to 
the improvement of logic. It is easy to show that the doctrine that familiar use and 
abstract distinctness make the perfection of apprehension has its only true place 
in philosophies which have long been extinct; and it is now time to formulate the 
method of attaining to a more perfect clearness of thought, such as we see and 
admire in the thinkers of our own time.
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When Descartes set about the reconstruction of philosophy, his first step was 
to (theoretically) permit scepticism and to discard the practice of the schoolmen 
of looking to authority as the ultimate source of truth. That done, he sought a 
more natural fountain of true principles, and thought he found it in the human 
mind; thus passing, in the directest way, from the method of authority to that 
of apriority, as described in my first paper. Selfconsciousnesswas to furnish us 
with our fundamental truths, and to decide what was agreeable to reason. But 
since, evidently, not all ideas are true, he was led to note, as the first condition of 
infallibility, that they must be clear. The distinction between an idea seeming clear 
and really being so, never occurred to him. Trusting to introspection, as he did, 
even for a knowledge of external things, why should he question its testimony in 
respect to the contents of ourown minds? But then, I suppose, seeng men, who 
seemed to be quite clear and positive, holding opposite opinionsupon fundamental 
principles, he was further led to say that clearness of ideas is not sufficient, but 
that they need alsoto be distinct, i.e., to have nothing unclear about them. What 
he probably meant by this (for he did not explainhimself with precision) was, that 
they must sustain the test of dialectical examination; that they must not only seem 
clear at the outset, but that discussion must never be able to bring to light points 
of obscurity connected with them.
Such was the distinction of Descartes, and one sees that it was precisely on 
the level of his philosophy. It was somewhat developed by Leibnitz. This great and 
singular genius was as remarkable for what he failed to see as for what he saw. That 
a piece of mechanism could not do work perpetually without being fed with power 
in some form, was a thing perfectly apparent to him; yet he did not understand 
that the machinery of the mind can only transform knowledge, but never originate 
it, unless it be fed with facts of observation. He thus missed the most essential 
point of the Cartesian philosophy, which is, that to accept propositions which 
seem perfectly evident to us is a thing which, whether it be logical or illogical, we 
cannot help doing. Instead of regarding the matter in this way, he sought to reduce 
the first principles of science to two classes, those which cannot be denied without 
selfcontradiction, and those which result from the principle of sufficient reason (of 
which more anon), and was apparently unaware of the great difference between 
his position and that of Descartes. So he reverted to the old trivialities of logic; 
and, above all, abstract definitions played a great part in his philosophy. It was 
quite natural, therefore, that on observing that the method of Descartes labored 
under the difficulty that we may seem to ourselves to have clear apprehensions 
of ideas which in truth are very hazy, no better remedy occurred to him than to 
require an abstract definition of every important term. Accordingly, in adopting 
the distinction of clear and distinct notions, he described the latter quality as 
the clear apprehension of everything contained in the definition; and the books 
have ever since copied his words. There is no danger that his chimerical scheme 
will ever again be over-valued. Nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing 
definitions. Nevertheless, our existing beliefs can be set in order by this process, 
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and order is an essential element of intellectual economy, as of every other. It may 
be acknowledged, therefore, that the books are right in making familiarity with a 
notion the first step toward clearness of apprehension, and the defining of it the 
second. But in omitting all mention of any higher perspicuity of thought, they 
simply mirror a philosophy which was exploded a hundred years ago. That much-
admired “ornament of logic” – the doctrine of clearness and distinctness -- may 
be pretty enough, but it is high time to relegate to our cabinet of curiosities the 
antique bijou, and to wear about us something better adapted to modern uses.
The very first lesson that we have a right to demand that logic shall teach us 
is, how to make our ideas clear; and a most important one it is, depreciated only 
by minds who stand in need of it. To know what we think, to be masters of our 
own meaning, will make a solid foundation for great and weighty thought. It is 
most easily learnedby those whose ideas are meagre and restricted; and far happier 
they than such as wallow helplessly in a rich mud of conceptions. A nation, it is 
true, may, in the course of generations, overcome the disadvantage of an excessive 
wealth of language and its natural concomitant, a vast, unfathomable deep of ideas. 
We may see it in history, slowly perfecting its literary forms, sloughing at length its 
metaphysics, and, by virtue of the untirable patience which is often a compensation, 
attaining great excellence in every branch of mental acquirement. The page of 
history is not yet unrolled that is to tell us whether such a people will or will not in 
the long run prevail over one whose ideas (like the words of their language) are few, 
but which possesses a wonderful mastery over those which it has. For an individual, 
however, there can be no question that a few clear ideas are worth more than many 
confused ones. A young man would hardly be persuaded to sacrifice the greater 
part of his thoughts to save the rest; and the muddled head is the least apt to see 
the necessity of such a sacrifice. Him we can usually only commiserate, as a person 
with a congenital defect. Time will help him, but intellectual maturity with regard 
to clearness is apt to come rather late. This seems an unfortunate arrangement of 
Nature, inasmuch as clearness is of less use to a man settled in life, whose errors have 
in great measure had their effect, than it would be to one whose path lay before 
him. It is terrible to see how a single unclear idea, a single formula without meaning, 
lurking in a young man’s head, will sometimes act like an obstruction of inert matter 
in an artery, hindering the nutrition of the brain, and condemning its victim to pine 
away in the fullness of his intellectual vigor and in the midst of intellectual plenty. 
Many a man has cherished for years as his hobby some vague shadow of an idea, 
too meaningless to be positively false; he has, nevertheless, passionately loved it, 
has made it his companion by day and by night, and has given to it his strength and 
his life, leaving all other occupations for its sake, and in short has lived with it and 
for it, until it has become, as it were, flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone; and 
then he has waked up some bright morning to find it gone, clean vanished away like 
the beautiful Melusina of the fable, and the essence of his life gone with it. I have 
myself known such a man; and who can tell how many histories of circle-squarers, 
metaphysicians, astrologers, and what not, maynot be told in the old German story?
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ii
The principles set forth in the first part of this essay lead, at once, to a method 
of reaching a clearness of thought of higher grade than the “distinctness” of the 
logicians. It was there noticed that the action of thought is excited by the irritation 
of doubt, and ceases when belief is attained; so that the production of belief 
is the sole function of thought. All these words, however, are too strong for my 
purpose. It is as if I had described the phenomena as they appear under a mental 
microscope. Doubt and Belief, as the words are commonly employed, relate to 
religious or other grave discussions. But here I use them to designate the starting 
of any question, no matter how small or how great, and the resolution of it. If, for 
instance, in a horse-car, I pull out my purse and find a fivecent nickel and five 
coppers, I decide, while my hand is going to the purse, in which way I will pay 
my fare. To call such a question Doubt, and my decision Belief, is certainly to use 
words very disproportionate to the occasion. To speak of such a doubt as causing an 
irritation which needs to be appeased, suggests a temper which is uncomfortable 
to the verge of insanity. Yet, looking at the matter minutely, it must be admitted 
that, if there is the least hesitation as to whether I shall pay the five coppers or the 
nickel (as there will be sure to be, unless I act from some previously contracted 
habit in the matter), though irritation is too strong a word, yet I am excited to 
such small mental activity as may be necessary to deciding how I shall act. Most 
frequently doubts arise from some indecision, however momentary, in our action. 
Sometimes it is not so. I have, for example, to wait in a railway-station, and to 
pass the time I read the advertisements on the walls. I compare the advantages of 
different trains and different routes which I never expect to take, merely fancying 
myself to be in a state of hesitancy, because I am bored with having nothing to 
trouble me. Feigned hesitancy, whether feigned for mere amusement or with a 
lofty purpose, plays a great part in the production of scientific inquiry. However 
the doubt may originate, it stimulates the mind to an activity which may be slight 
or energetic, calm or turbulent. Images pass rapidly through consciousness, one 
incessantly melting into another, until at last, when all is over -- it may be in a 
fraction of a second, in an hour, or after long years -- we find ourselves decided 
as to how we should act under such circumstances as those which occasioned our 
hesitation. In other words, we have attained belief.
In this process we observe two sorts of elements of consciousness, the distinction 
between which may best be made clear by means of an illustration. In a piece of music 
there are the separate notes, and there is the air. A single tone may be prolonged 
for an hour or a day, and it exists as perfectly in each second of that time as in the 
whole taken together; so that, as long as it is sounding, it might be present to a sense 
from which everything in the past was as completely absent as the future itself. But 
it is different with the air, the performance of which occupies a certain time, during 
the portions of which only portions of it are played. It consists in an orderliness in 
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the succession of sounds which strike the ear at different times; and to perceive it 
there must be some continuity of consciousness which makes the events of a lapse 
of time present to us. We certainly only perceive the air by hearing the separate 
notes; yet we cannot be said to directly hear it, for we hear only what is present at 
the instant, and an orderliness of succession cannot exist in an instant. These two 
sorts of objects, what we are immediately conscious of and what we are mediately 
conscious of, are found in all consciousness. Some elements (the sensations) are 
completely present at every instant so long as they last, while others (like thought) 
are actions having beginning, middle, and end, and consist in a congruence in the 
succession of sensations which flow through the mind. They cannot be immediately 
present to us, but must cover some portion of the past or future. Thought is a thread 
of melody running through the succession of our sensations.
We may add that just as a piece of music may be written in parts, each part 
having its own air, so various systems of relationship of succession subsist together 
between the same sensations. These different systems are distinguished by having 
different motives, ideas, or functions. Thought is only one such system, for its sole 
motive, idea, and function is to produce belief, and whatever does not concern 
that purpose belongs to some other system of relations. The action of thinking may 
incidentally have other results; it may serve to amuse us, for example, and among 
dilettanti it is not rare to find those who have so perverted thought to the purposes 
of pleasure that it seems to vex them to think that the questions upon which they 
delight to exercise it may ever get finally settled; and a positive discovery which 
takes a favorite subject out of the arena of literary debate is met with ill-concealed 
dislike. This disposition is the very debauchery of thought. But the soul and meaning 
of thought, abstracted from the other elements which accompany it, though it 
may be voluntarily thwarted, can never be made to direct itself toward anything 
but the production of belief. Thought in action has for its only possible motive the 
attainment of thought at rest; and whatever does not refer to belief is no part of the 
thought itself.
And what, then, is belief? It is the demi-cadence which closes a musical phrase in 
the symphony of our intellectual life. We have seen that it has just three properties: 
First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; 
and, third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say 
for short, a habit. As it appeases the irritation of doubt, which is the motive for 
thinking, thought relaxes, and comes to rest for a moment when belief is reached. 
But, since belief is a rule for action, the application of which involves further doubt 
and further thought, at the same time that it is a stopping-place, it is also a new 
starting-place for thought. That is why I have permitted myself to call it thought at 
rest, although thought is essentially an action. The final upshot of thinking is the 
exercise of volition, and of this thought no longer forms a part; but belief is only 
a stadium of mental action, an effect upon our nature due to thought, which will 
influence future thinking.
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The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are 
distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do 
not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same 
rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them 
can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys 
is playing different tunes. Imaginary distinctions are often drawn between beliefs 
which differ only in their mode of expression; -- the wrangling which ensues is 
real enough, however. To believe that any objects are arranged among themselves 
as in Fig. 1, and to believe that they are arranged in Fig. 2, are one and the same 
belief; yet it is conceivable that a man should assert one proposition and deny the 
other. Such false distinctions do as much harm as the confusion of beliefs really 
different, and are among the pitfalls of which we ought constantly to beware, 
especially when we are upon metaphysical ground. One singular deception of 
this sort, which often occurs, is to mistake the sensation produced by our own 
unclearness of thought for a character of the object we are thinking. Instead of 
perceiving that the obscurity is purely subjective, we fancy that we contemplate 
a quality of the object which is essentially mysterious; and if our conception be 
afterward presented to us in a clear form we do not recognize it as the same, 
owing to the absence of the feeling of unintelligibility. So long as this deception 
lasts, it obviously puts an impassable barrier in the way of perspicuous thinking; so 
that it equally interests the opponents of rational thought to perpetuate it, and its 
adherents to guard against it.
Another such deception is to mistake a mere difference in the grammatical 
construction of two words for a distinction between the ideas they express. In this 
pedantic age, when the general mob of writers attend so much more to words 
than to things, this error is common enough. When I just said that thought is an 
action, and that it consists in a relation, although a person performs an action 
but not a relation, which can only be the result of an action, yet there was no 
inconsistency in what I said, but only a grammatical vagueness.
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From all these sophisms we shall be perfectly safe so long as we reflect that the 
whole function of thought is to produce habits of action; and that whatever there 
is connected with a thought, but irrelevant to its purpose, is an accretion to it, but 
no part of it. If there be a unity among our sensations which has no reference to 
how we shall act on a given occasion, as when we listen to a piece of music, why 
we do not call that thinking. To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, simply 
to determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits 
it involves. Now, the identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act, 
not merely under such circumstances as are likely to arise, but under such as 
might possibly occur, no matter how improbable they may be. What the habit 
is depends on when and how it causes us to act. As for the when, every stimulus 
to action is derived from perception; as for the how, every purpose of action is 
to produce some sensible result. Thus, we come down to what is tangible and 
conceivably practical, as the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter 
how subtile itmay be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist 
in anything but a possible difference of practice.
To see what this principle leads to, consider in the light of it such a doctrine as 
that of transubstantiation. The Protestant churches generally hold that the elements 
of the sacrament are flesh and blood only in a tropical sense; they nourish our 
souls as meat and the juice of it would our bodies. But the Catholics maintain 
that they are literally just meat and blood; although they possess all the sensible 
qualities of wafercakes and diluted wine. But we can have no conception of wine 
except what may enter into a belief, either –
1. That this, that, or the other, is wine; or,
2. That wine possesses certain properties.
Such beliefs are nothing but self-notifications that we should, upon occasion, 
act in regard to such things as we believe to be wine according to the qualities 
which we believe wine to possess. The occasion of such action would be some 
sensible perception, the motive of it to produce some sensible result. Thus our 
action has exclusive reference to what affects the senses, our habit has the same 
bearing as our action, our belief the same as our habit, our conception the same as 
our belief; and we can consequently mean nothing by wine but what has certain 
effects, direct or indirect, upon our senses; and to talk of something as having 
all the sensible characters of wine, yet being in reality blood, is senseless jargon. 
Now, it is not my object to pursue the theological question; and having used it as a 
logical example I drop it, without caring to anticipate the theologian’s reply. I only 
desire to point out how impossible it is that we should have an idea in our minds 
which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects of things. Our idea of 
anything is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any other 
we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought 
for a part of the thought itself. It is absurd to say that thought has any meaning 
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unrelated to its only function. It is foolish for Catholics and Protestants to fancy 
themselves in disagreement about the elements of the sacrament, if they agree in 
regard to all their sensible effects, here and hereafter.
It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of 
apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception tohave. Then, our 
conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
iii
Let us illustrate this rule by some examples; and, to begin with the simplest one 
possible, let us ask what we mean by calling a thing hard. Evidently that it will not 
be scratched by many other substances. The whole conception of this quality, as of 
every other, lies in its conceived effects. There is absolutely no difference between 
a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test. Suppose, 
then, that a diamond could be crystallized in the midst of a cushion of soft cotton, 
and should remain there until it was finally burned up. Would it be false to say that 
that diamond was soft? This seems a foolish question, and would be so, in fact, 
except in the realm of logic. There such questions are often of the greatest utility 
as serving to bring logical principles into sharper relief than real discussions ever 
could. In studying logic we must not put them aside with hasty answers, but must 
consider them with attentive care, in order to make out the principles involved. 
We may, in the present case, modify our question, and ask what prevents us from 
saying that all hard bodies remain perfectly soft until they are touched, when their 
hardness increases with the pressure until they are scratched. Reflection will show 
that the reply is this: there would be no falsity in such modes of speech. They 
would involve a modification of our present usage of speech with regard to the 
words hard and soft, but not of their meanings. For they represent no fact to be 
different from what it is; only they involve arrangements of facts which would be 
exceedingly maladroit. This leads us toremark that the question of what would 
occur under circumstances which do not actually arise is not a question of fact, 
but only of the most perspicuous arrangement of them. For example, the question 
of free-will and fate in its simplest form, stripped of verbiage, is something like 
this: I have done something of which I am ashamed; could I, by an effort of the 
will, have resisted the temptation, and done otherwise? The philosophical reply is, 
that this is not a question of fact, but only of the arrangement of facts. Arranging 
them so as to exhibit what is particularly pertinent to my question -- namely, that 
I ought to blame myself for having done wrong -- it is perfectly true to say that, 
if I had willed to do otherwise than I did, I should have done otherwise. On the 
other hand, arranging the facts so as to exhibit another important consideration, 
it is equally true that, when a temptation has once been allowed to work, it will, 
if it has a certain force, produce its effect, let me struggle how I may. There is no 
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objection to a contradiction in what would result from a false supposition. The 
reductio ad absurdum consists in showing that contradictory results would follow 
from a hypothesis which is consequently judged to be false. Many questions are 
involved in the freewill discussion, and I am far from desiring to say that both sides 
are equally right. On the contrary, I am of opinion that one side denies important 
facts, and that the other does not. But what I do say is, that the above single 
question was the origin of the whole doubt; that, had it not been for this question, 
the controversy would never have arisen; and that this question is perfectly solved 
in the manner which I have indicated.
Let us next seek a clear idea of Weight. This is another very easy case. To say 
that a body is heavy means simply that, in the absence of opposing force, it will 
fall. This (neglecting certain specifications of how it will fall, etc., which exist in 
the mind of the physicist who uses the word) is evidently the whole conception 
of weight. It is a fair question whether some particular facts may not account for 
gravity; but what we mean by the force itself is completely involved in its effects.
This leads us to undertake an account of the idea of Force in general. This 
is the great conception which, developed in the early part of the seventeenth 
century from the rude idea of a cause, and constantly improved upon since, has 
shown us how to explain all the changes of motion which bodies experience, and 
how to think about all physical phenomena; which has given birth to modern 
science, and changed the face of the globe; and which, aside from its more special 
uses, has played a principal part in directing the course of modern thought, and 
in furthering modern social development. It is, therefore, worth some pains 
to comprehend it. According to our rule, we must begin by asking what is the 
immediate use of thinking about force; and the answer is, that we thus account for 
changes of motion. If bodies were left to themselves, without the intervention of 
forces, every motion would continue unchanged both in velocity and in direction. 
Furthermore, change of motion never takes place abruptly; if its direction is 
changed, it is always through a curve without angles; if its velocity alters, it is by 
degrees. The gradual changes which are constantly taking place are conceived by 
geometers to be compounded together according to the rules of the parallelogram 
of forces. If the reader does not already know what this is, he will find it, I hope, to 
his advantage to endeavor to follow the following explanation; but if mathematics 
are insupportable to him, pray let him skip three paragraphs rather than that we 
should part company here.
A path is a line whose beginning and end are distinguished. Two paths are 
considered to be equivalent, which, beginning at the same point, lead to the same 
point. Thus the two paths, A B C D E and A F G H E, are equivalent. Paths which 
do not begin at the same point are considered to be equivalent, provided that, 
on moving either of them without turning it, but keeping it always parallel to its 
original position, when its beginning coincides with that of the other path, the 
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ends also coincide. Paths are considered as geometrically added together, when 
one begins where the other ends; thus the path A E is conceived to be a sum of A 
B, B C, C D, and D E. In the parallelogram of Fig. 4 the diagonal A C is the sum of 
A B and B C; or, since A D is geometrically equivalent to B C, A C is the geometrical 
sum of A B and A D.
All this is purely conventional. It simply amounts to this: that we choose to 
call paths having the relations I have described equal or added. But, though it 
is a convention, it is a convention with a good reason. The rule for geometrical 
addition may be applied not only to paths, but to any other things which can be 
represented by paths. Now, as a path is determined by the varying direction and 
distance of the point which moves over it from the starting-point, it follows that 
anything which from its beginning to its end is determined by a varying direction 
and a varying magnitude is capable of being represented by a line. Accordingly, 
velocities may be represented by lines, for they have only directions and rates. The 
same thing is true of accelerations, or changes of velocities. This is evident enough 
in the case of velocities; and it becomes evident for accelerations if we consider 
that precisely what velocities are to positions -- namely, states of change of them 
-- that accelerations are to velocities.
The so-called “parallelogram of forces” is simply a rule for compounding 
accelerations. The rule is, to represent the accelerations by paths, and then 
to geometrically add the paths. The geometers, however, not only use the 
“parallelogram of forces” to compound different accelerations, but also to resolve 
one acceleration into a sum of several. Let A B (Fig. 5) be the path which represents 
a certain acceleration -- say, such a change in the motion of a body that at the end 
of one second the body will, under the influence of that change, be in a position 
different from what it would have had if its motion had continued unchanged such 
that a path equivalent to A B would lead from the latter position to the former. This 
acceleration may be considered as the sum of the accelerations represented by A 
C and C B. It may also be considered as the sum of the very different accelerations 
represented by A D and D B, where A D is almost the opposite of A C. And it is 
clear that there is an immense variety of ways in which A B might be resolved into 
the sum of two accelerations.
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After this tedious explanation, which I hope, in view of the extraordinary 
interest of the conception of force, may not have exhausted the reader’s patience, 
we are prepared at last to state the grand fact which this conception embodies. This 
fact is that if the actual changes of motion which the different particles of bodies 
experience are each resolved in its appropriate way, each component acceleration 
is precisely such as is prescribed by a certain law of Nature, according to which 
bodies, in the relative positions which the bodies in question actually have at 
the moment, always receive certain accelerations, which, being compounded by 
geometrical addition, give the acceleration which the body actually experiences.
This is the only fact which the idea of force represents, and whoever will take 
the trouble clearly to apprehend what this fact is, perfectly comprehends what 
force is. Whether we ought to say that a force is an acceleration, or that it causes an 
acceleration, is a mere question of propriety of language, which has no more to do 
with our real meaning than the difference between the French idiom “Il fait froid” 
and its English equivalent “It is cold.” Yet it is surprising to see how this simple affair 
has muddled men’s minds. In how many profound treatises is not force spoken 
of as a “mysterious entity,” which seems to be only a way of confessing that the 
author despairs of ever getting a clear notion of what the word means! In a recent 
admired work on Analytic Mechanics it is stated that we understand precisely 
the effect of force, but what force itself is we do not understand! This is simply a 
selfcontradiction. The idea which the word force excites in our minds has no other 
function than to affect our actions, and these actions can have no reference to force 
otherwise than through its effects. Consequently, if we know what the effects of 
force are, we are acquainted with every fact which is implied in saying that a force 
exists, and there is nothing more to know. The truth is, there is some vague notion 
afloat that a question may mean something which the mind cannot conceive; and 
when some hair-splitting philosophers have been confronted with the absurdity 
of such a view, they have invented an empty distinction between positive and 
negative conceptions, in the attempt to give their non-idea a form not obviously 
nonsensical. The nullity of it is sufficiently plain from the considerations given a 
few pages back; and, apart from those considerations, the quibbling character of 
the distinction must have struck every mind accustomed to real thinking.
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iv
Let us now approach the subject of logic, and consider a conception which 
particularly concerns it, that of reality. Taking clearness in the sense of familiarity, 
no idea could be clearer than this. Every child uses it with perfect confidence, 
never dreaming that he does not understand it. As for clearness in its second grade, 
however, it would probably puzzle most men, even among those of a reflective 
turn of mind, to give an abstract definition of the real. Yet such a definition may 
perhaps be reached by considering the points of difference between reality and 
its opposite, fiction. A figment is a product of somebody’s imagination; it has such 
characters as his thought impresses upon it. That those characters are independent 
of how you or I think is an external reality. There are, however, phenomena within 
our own minds, dependent upon our thought, which are at the same time real in 
the sense that we really think them. But though their characters depend on how 
we think, they do not depend on what we think those characters to be. Thus, 
a dream has a real existence as a mental phenomenon, if somebody has really 
dreamt it; that he dreamt so and so, does not depend on what anybody thinks 
was dreamt, but is completely independent of all opinion on the subject. On the 
other hand, considering, not the fact of dreaming, but the thing dreamt, it retains 
its peculiarities by virtue of no other fact than that it was dreamt to possess them. 
Thus we may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what 
anybody may think them to be.
But, however satisfactory such a definition may be found, it would be a great 
mistake to suppose that it makes the idea of reality perfectly clear. Here, then, let 
us apply our rules. According to them, reality, like every other quality, consists in 
the peculiar sensible effects which things partaking of it produce. The only effect 
which real things have is to cause belief, for all the sensations which they excite 
emerge into consciousness in the form of beliefs. The question therefore is, how is 
true belief (or belief in the real) distinguished from false belief (or belief in fiction). 
Now, as we have seen in the former paper, the ideas of truth and falsehood, in 
their full development, appertain exclusively to the experiential method of settling 
opinion. A person who arbitrarily chooses the propositions which he will adopt 
can use the word truth only to emphasize the expression of his determination 
to hold on to his choice. Of course, the method of tenacity never prevailed 
exclusively; reason is too natural to men for that. But in the literature of the dark 
ages we find some fine examples of it. When Scotus Erigena is commenting upon 
a poetical passage in which hellebore is spoken of as having caused the death of 
Socrates, he does not hesitate to inform the inquiring reader that Helleborus and 
Socrates were two eminent Greek philosophers, and that the latter, having been 
overcome in argument by the former, took the matter to heart and died of it! What 
sort of an idea of truth could a man have who could adopt and teach, without the 
qualification of a perhaps, an opinion taken so entirely at random? The real spirit 
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of Socrates, who I hope would have been delighted to have been “overcome in 
argument,” because he would have learned something by it, is in curious contrast 
with the naive idea of the glossist, for whom (as for “the born missionary” of today) 
discussion would seem to have been simply a struggle. When philosophy began 
to awake from its long slumber, and before theology completely dominated it, the 
practice seems to have been for each professor to seize upon any philosophical 
position he found unoccupied and which seemed a strong one, to intrench himself 
in it, and to sally forth from time to time to give battle to the others. Thus, even 
the scanty records we possess of those disputes enable us to make out a dozen or 
more opinions held by different teachers at one time concerning the question of 
nominalism and realism. Read the opening part of the Historia.
Calamitatum of Abelard, who was certainly as philosophical as any of his 
contemporaries, and see the spirit of combat which it breathes. For him, the truth 
is simply his particular stronghold. When the method of authority prevailed, the 
truth meant little more than the Catholic faith. All the efforts of the scholastic 
doctors are directed toward harmonizing their faith in Aristotle and their faith in 
the Church, and one may search their ponderous folios through without finding 
an argument which goes any further. It is noticeable that where different faiths 
flourish side by side, renegades are looked upon with contempt even by the party 
whose belief they adopt; so completely has the idea of loyalty replaced that of 
truth-seeking. Since the time of Descartes, the defect in the conception of truth 
has been less apparent. Still, it will sometimes strike a scientific man that the 
philosophers have been less intent on finding out what the facts are, than on 
inquiring what belief is most in harmony with their system. It is hard to convince a 
follower of the a priori method by adducing facts; but show him that an opinion he 
is defending is inconsistent with what he has laid down elsewhere, and he will be 
very apt to retract it. These minds do not seem to believe that disputation is ever 
to cease; they seem to think that the opinion which is natural for one man is not 
so for another, and that belief will, consequently, never be settled. In contenting 
themselves with fixing their own opinions by a method which would lead another 
man to a different result, they betray their feeble hold of the conception of what 
truth is.
On the other hand, all the followers of science are animated by a cheerful 
hope that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one 
certain solution to each question to which they apply it. Oneman may investigate 
the velocity of light by studying the transits of Venus and the aberration of the 
stars; another by the oppositions of Mars and the eclipses of Jupiter’s satellites; a 
third by the method of Fizeau; a fourth by that of Foucault; a fifth by the motions 
of the curves of Lissajoux; a sixth, a seventh, an eighth, and a ninth, may follow the 
different methods of comparing the measures of statical and dynamical electricity. 
They may at first obtain different results, but, as each perfects his method and 
his processes, the results are found to move steadily together toward a destined 
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centre. So with all scientific research. Different minds may set out with the most 
antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside 
of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we 
are carried, not where we wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the operation of 
destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for 
study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate 
opinion. This great hope is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The 
opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what 
we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That 
is the way I would explain reality.
But it may be said that this view is directly opposed to the abstract definition 
which we have given of reality, inasmuch as it makes the characters of the real 
depend on what is ultimately thought about them. But the answer to this is that, 
on the one hand, reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, 
but only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it; and 
that, on the other hand, though the object of the final opinion depends on what 
that opinion is, yet what that opinion is does not depend on what you or I or 
any man thinks. Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the 
settlement of opinion; it might even conceivably cause an arbitrary proposition 
to be universally accepted as long as the human race should last. Yet even that 
would not change the nature of the belief, which alone could be the result of 
investigation carried sufficiently far; and if, after the extinction of our race, another 
should arise with faculties and disposition for investigation, that true opinion must 
be the one which they would ultimately come to. “Truth crushed to earth shall 
rise again,” and the opinion which would finally result from investigation does 
not depend on how anybody may actually think. But the reality of that which is 
real does depend on the real fact that investigation is destined to lead, at last, if 
continued long enough, to a belief in it.
But I may be asked what I have to say to all the minute facts of history, forgotten 
never to be recovered, to the lost books of the ancients, to the buried secrets.
“Full many a gem of purest ray serene
The dark, unfathomed caves of ocean bear;
Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness on the desert air.”
Do these things not really exist because they are hopelessly beyond the reach 
of our knowledge? And then, after the universe is dead (according to the prediction 
of some scientists), and all life has ceased forever, will not the shock of atoms 
continue though there will be no mind to know it? To this I reply that, though in 
no possible state of knowledge can any number be great enough to express the 
relation between the amount of what rests unknown to the amount of the known, 
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yet it is unphilosophical to suppose that, with regard to any given question (which 
has any clear meaning), investigation would not bring forth a solution of it, if it 
were carried far enough. Who would have said, a few years ago, that we could 
ever know of what substances stars are made whose light may have been longer in 
reaching us than the human race has existed? Who can be sure of what we shall 
not know in a few hundred years? Who can guess what would be the result of 
continuing the pursuit of science for ten thousand years, with the activity of the 
last hundred? And if it were to go on for a million, or a billion, or any number of 
years you please, how is it possible to say that there is any question which might 
not ultimately be solved?
But it may be objected, “Why make so much of these remote considerations, 
especially when it is your principle that only practical distinctions have a meaning?” 
Well, I must confess that it makes very little difference whether we say that a stone 
on the bottom of the ocean, in complete darkness, is brilliant or not -- that is to 
say, that it probably makes no difference, remembering always that that stone may 
be fished up tomorrow. But that there are gems at the bottom of the sea, flowers 
in the untraveled desert, etc., are propositions which, like that about a diamond 
being hard when it is not pressed, concern much more the arrangement of our 
language than they do the meaning of our ideas.
It seems to me, however, that we have, by the application of our rule, reached 
so clear an apprehension of what we mean by reality, and of the fact which the idea 
rests on, that we should not, perhaps, be making a pretension so presumptuous 
as it would be singular, if we were to offer a metaphysical theory of existence for 
universal acceptance among those who employ the scientific method of fixing 
belief. However, as metaphysics is a subject much more curious than useful, the 
knowledge of which, like that of a sunken reef, serves chiefly to enable us to keep 
clear of it, I will not trouble the reader with any more Ontology at this moment. 
I have already been led much further into that path than I should have desired; 
and I have given the reader such a dose of mathematics, psychology, and all that 
is most abstruse, that I fear he may already have left me, and that what I am 
now writing is for the compositor and proof-reader exclusively. I trusted to the 
importance of the subject. There is no royal road to logic, and really valuable ideas 
can only be had at the price of close attention. But I know that in the matter of 
ideas the public prefer the cheap and nasty; and in my next paper I am going to 
return to the easily intelligible, and not wander from it again. The reader who has 
been at the pains of wading through this paper, shall be rewarded in the next one 
by seeing how beautifully what has been developed in this tedious way can be 
applied to the ascertainment of the rules of scientific reasoning.
We have, hitherto, not crossed the threshold of scientific logic. It is certainly 
important to know how to make our ideas clear, but they may be ever so clear 
without being true. How to make them so, we have next to study. How to give 
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birth to those vital and procreative ideas which multiply into a thousand forms 
and diffuse themselves everywhere, advancing civilization and making the dignity 
of man, is an art not yet reduced to rules, but of the secret of which the history of 
science affords some hints.
Notes
1. Possibly the velocities also have to be taken into account.
2. Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and can nohow be avoided. 
It is a superstition to suppose that a certain sort of events are ever fated, and it is 
another to suppose that the word fate can never be freed from its superstitious 
taint. We are all fated to die.
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